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YOU’LL NEVER WORK (OR PLAY) HERE
AGAIN: A LINGERING QUESTION IN TITLE
IX RETALIATION CLAIMS BROUGHT BY
COACHES AND ATHLETES AFTER JACKSON
V. BIRMINGHAM BOARD OF EDUCATION
BRIAN L. PORTO *
I. INTRODUCTION
Like many promising forty-year-olds, Title IX has already realized some
significant achievements but has more to accomplish if it is to live up to its
Regarding the achievements to date, various
enormous potential. 1
commentaries have described the social revolution to which Title IX has
contributed mightily during the past four decades, especially the increased
athletic-participation opportunities for girls and women. 2 The New York
Times recently sent its readers a charming postcard from that revolution,
namely, a story about the homecoming queen at a Michigan high school who
doubles as the place-kicker on her school’s football team, which would have
been unthinkable when her grandparents were in high school.3 Still, hurdles
remain to be cleared, not the least of which is an unfortunate tendency among
schools and colleges to retaliate against whistleblowers who complain about
the unequal treatment of male and female athletes.
Perhaps the best known Title IX whistleblower in the United States is
Roderick Jackson, the coach of a girls’ basketball team in Birmingham,
Alabama, whose players had to practice in “an old, unheated gymnasium on a
nonregulation-size court with bent rims,” while their male counterparts

* Associate Professor, Vermont Law School. J.D., Indiana University-Bloomington, 1987; Ph.D.
(Political Science), Miami University (Ohio), 1979; B.A., University of Rhode Island, 1974.
1. Title IX of the Educational Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681–88 (2012).
2. See, e.g., Brian L. Porto, Halfway Home: An Update on Title IX and College Sports, 34 VT.
B.J. & L. DIG. 28, 28 (2008) (noting that the number of women playing varsity sports in college had
increased from less than 30,000 to more than 180,000 since 1972 and that the percentage of female
varsity athletes at American colleges and universities had increased to 45); see also NAT’L WOMEN’S
LAW CTR., BARRIERS TO FAIR PLAY 1 (2007), available at http://www.nwlc.org/sites/default/files/
pdfs/barrierstofairplay.pdf (citing similar statistics).
3. Micheline Maynard, Even in a Locker Room Apart, an Undeniable Leap of Progress, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 9, 2011, at SP12.
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enjoyed the benefits of a new, heated gym. 4 The girls were also forced to
make do with less gym time, defective equipment, inequitable travel
arrangements, and the absence of amenities such as an ice machine for
supplying ice packs. 5 Coach Jackson complained to the athletic director and
the principal, but the only change that occurred was Jackson’s loss of his
coaching job, although he kept his teaching position at the school.6 His efforts
were ultimately rewarded, though, when the U.S. Supreme Court held in
Jackson v. Birmingham Board of Education that “the private right of action
implied by Title IX encompasses claims of retaliation . . . [when] the funding
recipient [i.e., school or college] retaliates against an individual because he [or
she] has complained about sex discrimination.” 7
The Jackson decision has had a major impact on Title IX jurisprudence by
extending the statute’s reach to whistleblowers who suffer retaliation for
demanding gender equity in interscholastic and intercollegiate athletic
programs. After Jackson, these individuals have a legal recourse that they
lacked before 2005.8 Nevertheless, although Jackson has surely empowered
whistleblowers, it has hardly ended retaliation against them, as several recent
cases against a California university illustrate. California State University,
Fresno (Fresno State) “fired women’s volleyball coach Lindy Vivas in 2004
and women’s basketball coach Stacy Johnson-Klein in 2005, after each
woman complained about inequitable treatment of female athletes” by the
Fresno State athletic department. 9
In the Vivas case, the athletic director claimed that Coach Vivas was fired
for failing to meet performance clauses in her contract. No such clauses
existed in the employment contract of any other Fresno State coach, and the
clauses only entered Vivas’ contract after she asked for a long-term contract in
2003, having by then coached at Fresno State for twelve years.10 Moreover,
one strains to imagine what performance clause Vivas could possibly have
failed to meet because her career winning percentage was 0.612, she was a
three-time Western Athletic Conference Coach of the Year, her teams had
appeared in a postseason tournament six times, and the academic performance

4. DEBORAH L. BRAKE, GETTING IN THE GAME: TITLE IX AND THE WOMEN’S SPORTS
REVOLUTION 192 (2010).
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. 544 U.S. 167, 171 (2005).
8. Porto, supra note 2, at 32.
9. Id.
10. Jill Lieber Steeg, “Hard Time” for Vivas During Tenure at Fresno State, USA TODAY ,May
13, 2008, www.usatoday.com/sports/college/2008-05-12-titleix-vivas_N.htm.
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of her players was exemplary. 11 Under these circumstances, Vivas’ answer to
the question of why she was fired rings true. “‘The bottom line,’” she said,
referring to her superiors in the athletic department, “‘is they did not like
women who supported equity . . . . It always came down to that.’”12 The jury
in Vivas’ lawsuit against Fresno State agreed, awarding her a $5.85 million
verdict in July 2007. 13
The Johnson-Klein case was more complicated than the Vivas case;
Fresno State argued that it fired Johnson-Klein because she had obtained pain
medication from one of her players and lied to university officials about
having done so. 14 Still, a jury awarded Johnson-Klein $19.1 million, which a
judge reduced to $6.6 million in damages and $2.5 million in legal fees.15 The
university appealed, but in June 2008, while the appeal was pending, the
parties settled for $9 million. 16
In yet another case originating at Fresno State, the university, in October
2007, paid former Associate Athletic Director Diane Milutinovich $3.5 million
to settle her lawsuit, which she had filed in 2004, alleging that her
reassignment from the athletic department, where she had been the senior
women’s athletic administrator for twenty-one years, to the student union had
been “retaliation for her advocacy of equal treatment for female athletes.”17
The Fresno State cases may paint an unduly positive picture for Title IX
advocates because they reflect only the circumstances in which a coach or
athletic administrator challenged retaliation by filing a lawsuit. On the other
hand, a study by the National Women’s Law Center (NWLC) concluded that
“[c]oaches fear retaliation if they complain [about Title IX violations], so the
burden typically falls on students and their parents to protest
discrimination.” 18
NWLC studied 416 Title IX athletics complaints filed with or prepared by

11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Sara Lipka, Fresno State Grapples with a Spate of Sex-Discrimination Claims, CHRON.
HIGHER EDUC., Aug. 3, 2007, available at http://chronicle.com/article/Fresno-State-Grapples-Witha/5794.
14. Jill Lieber Steeg, Disputes Reflect Continuing Tension over Title IX, USA TODAY, May 13,
2008, at 1A.
15. Porto, supra note 2, at 32.
16. See Stacy Johnson-Klein Resurfaces, ERRATIC MAGIC (July 17, 2008, 10:20 PM),
http://www.erraticmagic.com/2008/07/stacy-johnson-klein-resurfaces.html.
17. George Hostetter, Fresno State Suit is Settled for $3.5M: Multinovich’s Deal Resolves Her
Sexual Discrimination Case Against the University, FRESNO BEE, Oct. 23, 2007, available at
http://www.fresnobee.com/2007/10/12/162548/fresno-state-suit-is-settled-for.html.
18. NAT’L WOMEN’S LAW CTR., supra note 2, at 2.
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the federal Department of Education’s Office for Civil Rights (OCR), which is
responsible for enforcing Title IX, between January 1, 2002, and December
31, 2006. 19 It found that, although coaches have greater access to information
than their athletes and are often in the best position to identify and challenge
discrimination, they filed fewer than eight percent (32 of 416) of the
complaints made within the period of the study. 20 Yet, sixteen of the thirtytwo complaints by coaches, or fifty percent, “alleged retaliation in addition to
other forms of discrimination against [themselves] and their female
athletes.” 21 The form of discrimination against female athletes most often
alleged was inequitable treatment. Of the 416 complaints studied, females
filed 375, of which 269 (almost 60%) alleged inequitable treatment of girls’ or
women’s teams regarding equipment, supplies, scheduling, financial support,
facilities, coaching, medical assistance, or publicity. 22 Nearly thirty percent of
the complaints filed by females alleged a lack of athletic participation
opportunities for female students. 23
The Fresno State cases and the NWLC study show that many inequities
remain for girls and women in interscholastic and intercollegiate athletics.
Under these circumstances, coaches and athletes will continue to lodge
complaints and, presumably, suffer retaliation as a result. In this environment,
it is important to know how broadly post-Jackson courts will interpret existing
law to facilitate successful Title IX-based retaliation actions by coaches and
athletes. Specifically, Title IX advocates wish to know if the law will protect
from retaliation a complainant who mistakenly contends that his or her
institution has violated Title IX. 24 This Article will discuss alternative
answers to that question and will offer an answer of its own.
Part II will discuss the Supreme Court’s decision and its reasoning in
Jackson. Part III will present the evidence for a continuing problem, after
Jackson, of retaliation against coaches who challenge their institutions’
alleged noncompliance with Title IX. Part IV will turn to the question noted
above, addressing both the problems inherent in trying to answer it and the
alternative answers that various scholars have offered. Part V will recommend
using either a contextual reasonableness or a good faith standard, instead of
the existing reasonable belief standard, to determine whether a plaintiff in a
Title IX retaliation action honestly thought the underlying conduct originally
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

Id. at 1.
Id. at 2.
Id.
Id. at 3–4.
Id. at 4.
BRAKE, supra note 4, at 193.
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complained of was unlawful. Either recommended alternative reflects the
youth and lack of legal sophistication of many Title IX complainants, and the
remedial purpose of Title IX, better than the reasonable belief standard does.
Part VI will conclude that the fortieth anniversary of Title IX provides a
wonderful opportunity to adopt a broad rule of interpretation designed to
protect from retaliation well-intentioned, but mistaken, Title IX complainants.
II. THE JACKSON DECISION
Roderick Jackson sued the Birmingham School Board, alleging that it had
retaliated against him, in violation of Title IX, for complaining about sex
discrimination in the athletic program at the high school where he coached.25
At issue in Jackson was “whether the implied private right of action in Title
IX encompasses claims of retaliation.”26 The five-member Court majority
(O’Connor, Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer) held that “it does where
the funding recipient retaliates against an individual because he has
complained about sex discrimination.”27
Justice O’Connor, writing for the majority, noted that Jackson’s team had
not received funding or access to equipment and facilities that was comparable
to what the school’s male athletes enjoyed, to the point that Jackson found it
difficult to coach his team properly. 28 His complaints to supervisors,
including the athletic director at his school, who was also the boys’ basketball
coach, went unanswered but not unpunished.29 In return for his complaints,
Jackson began to receive negative work evaluations, and he was ultimately
fired as a coach. 30
When Jackson filed suit, the district court granted the school board’s
motion to dismiss, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
affirmed. 31 According to the appellate court, Title IX did not create a private
right of action encompassing retaliation, and, even if it did, Jackson would not
have been entitled to relief because, not having suffered sex discrimination, he
was not within the class of persons whom the statute protected.32
The Supreme Court reversed, as Justice O’Connor observed that Title IX
swept broadly in prohibiting funding recipients from subjecting any person to
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

Jackson, 544 U.S. at 171.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 171–72.
Id. at 172.
Id.
Id.
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“‘discrimination’ ‘on the basis of sex.’” 33 In her view, “Retaliation against a
person because that person has complained of sex discrimination is another
form of intentional sex discrimination [under Title IX].” 34 “Retaliation,” she
added, “is, by definition, an intentional act.”35 It is discrimination because it
subjects the complaining party to differential treatment, and it “is
discrimination ‘on the basis of sex’ because it is an intentional response
to . . . an allegation of sex discrimination.” 36
In support of this view, Justice O’Connor noted that Congress has often
construed the term “discrimination” broadly within the Title IX context, which
the Eleventh Circuit ignored in holding that the statute does not prohibit
retaliation because it does not mention retaliation.37 After all, O’Connor
pointed out, Title IX does not mention sexual harassment either, but the Court
has held that sexual harassment is intentional discrimination to which the
private right of action under Title IX extends.38 Indeed, she reasoned,
Congress did not identify any specific discriminatory practices in Title IX;
therefore, its failure to mention retaliation “does not tell us anything about
whether it intended that practice to be covered.” 39
Furthermore, O’Connor opined, Congress enacted Title IX just three years
after the Court decided Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 40 which held that
42 U.S.C. § 1982, a statute prohibiting racial discrimination in buying, leasing,
and selling real and personal property, also prohibited retaliation against a
white man who had leased real property to a black man. 41 Under those
circumstances, she continued, it was reasonable to presume that Congress was
familiar with the Sullivan decision when it enacted Title IX and that
lawmakers expected courts to interpret Title IX in conformity with Sullivan. 42
Thus, the Supreme Court majority rejected the Birmingham School Board’s
argument that the private right of action in Title IX does not extend to actions
for retaliation.
The majority also rejected the school board’s contention that even if Title
IX applied to retaliation actions, it would not apply to Roderick Jackson’s

33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

Id. at 173 (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2005)).
Id.
Id. at 173–74.
Id. at 174.
Id.
Id. (citing Franklin v. Gwinnett Cnty. Pub. Schs., 503 U.S. 60, 74–75 (1992)).
Id. at 175.
396 U.S. 229 (1969).
Jackson, 544 U.S. at 176.
Id.
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action because he was, at most, an “indirect victim” of sex discrimination.43
Justice O’Connor answered this argument by observing, once again, that Title
IX is broadly worded, and, more precisely, that it does not require that the
victim of retaliation also be the victim of the sex discrimination that prompted
both the retaliation and the lawsuit. 44 For the school board’s interpretation to
be correct, she reasoned, the statute would have had to state that “‘no person
shall be subjected to discrimination on the basis of such individual’s sex.’”45
Because it did not so state, and because the broad interpretation of “on the
basis of sex” captured the spirit of the Sullivan decision, the Court concluded
that Roderick Jackson was within the class of persons whom Congress
envisioned bringing retaliation actions under Title IX’s auspices. 46
Finally, Justice O’Connor added, if Title IX were construed so as to
preclude actions for retaliation, “individuals who witness discrimination would
be loathe to report it, and all manner of Title IX violations might go
unremedied as a result.” 47 “Indeed,” she emphasized, “if retaliation were not
prohibited, Title IX’s enforcement scheme would unravel.”48 Besides, she
concluded, “teachers and coaches such as Jackson are often in the best position
to vindicate the rights of their students because they are better able to identify
discrimination and bring it to the attention of administrators.”49
Thus, the Jackson majority held that the implied private right of action in
Title IX encompassed actions for retaliation in addition to actions alleging sex
discrimination. The Court held further that Title IX protected not only victims
of sex discrimination but also persons who suffered retaliation after
complaining about sex discrimination against others. 50
Justice Thomas, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Kennedy, and
Justice Scalia, countered that both of the majority’s conclusions were
incorrect. First, he observed, Title IX does not protect victims of retaliation
because “retaliatory conduct is not discrimination on the basis of sex” within
the meaning of Title IX. 51 Second, he argued, “the natural meaning of the
phrase ‘on the basis of sex’ is on the basis of the plaintiff’s sex, not the sex of

43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Id. at 179.
Id.
Id. (emphasis in original).
Id. at 179–80.
Id. at 180.
Id.
Id. at 181.
Id. at 174.
Id. at 184 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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[someone else].” 52
In Justice Thomas’ view, Title IX did not protect Roderick Jackson’s
retaliation claim because that claim was unrelated to actual sex
discrimination.53 Instead, Thomas noted, Jackson alleged “that he suffered
reprisal because he complained about sex discrimination, not that the sex
discrimination underlying his complaint [had actually] occurred.” 54 Under
these circumstances, Justice Thomas reasoned, retaliation cannot be
discrimination on the basis of sex “because a retaliation claim may succeed
where no sex discrimination ever took place.” 55
Moreover, if Congress had intended Title IX to extend to retaliation
claims, it would have included in that statute a separate provision addressing
retaliation, as it did in Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act 56 (by prohibiting
employment discrimination on the basis of race, gender, and national origin),
the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 57 and the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (ADEA). 58 According to Justice Thomas, the presence of a
retaliation provision in Title VII, the ADA, and the ADEA plainly indicates
that “when Congress intends to include a prohibition against retaliation in a
statute, it does so.” 59 Thus, he concluded, Congress did not intend that Title
IX would extend to actions seeking to recover damages for retaliation. 60
Furthermore, Justice Thomas argued, even if Title IX extended to
retaliation actions, it would not benefit Roderick Jackson because he had not
suffered sex discrimination. In Thomas’ view, discrimination “on the basis of
sex” means discrimination on the basis of the claimant’s sex, as Congress
made clear in Title VII with respect to discrimination against pregnant
women 61 and as the Court consistently held in lawsuits alleging sex
discrimination. 62 But, in this case, Jackson did not claim that his own sex was
responsible for his superiors’ decision to relieve him of his coaching duties.63
Therefore, Justice Thomas concluded, the plain language of Title IX,
52. Id. at 185.
53. Id. at 186–87.
54. Id. at 187.
55. Id. at 188.
56. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2012).
57. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a) (2012).
58. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 623(d) (2012).
59. Jackson, 544 U.S. at 190 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
60. See id. at 196.
61. Id. at 185 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2005)).
62. Id. at 186 (citing Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 610 (1993); United States v.
Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 239 (1992); Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986)).
63. Id. at 186.
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prohibiting discrimination “on the basis of sex,” did not encompass retaliation
as Roderick Jackson experienced it.64
Justice O’Connor’s view prevailed in the Jackson case, though, extending
the statute’s reach beyond the direct victims of sex discrimination to
whistleblowers challenging sex discrimination against others in sports. 65 In so
doing, Professor Deborah Brake has noted, Jackson made all Americans
stakeholders in the enterprise of social equality and encouraged them to pursue
it by “ground[ing] Title IX’s protection from retaliation in what people do to
challenge gender inequality and not in their status as women or as athletes.”66
III. SEX DISCRIMINATION AND RETALIATION IN INTERSCHOLASTIC AND
INTERCOLLEGIATE SPORTS: THE POST-JACKSON LANDSCAPE
Jackson’s protection for Title IX whistleblowers has come not a moment
too soon because ample evidence exists that sex discrimination, and retaliation
for complaining about such discrimination, remain common in both school and
college sports. Recall that the NWLC studied 416 athletics complaints filed
with or prepared by OCR between January 1, 2002, and December 31, 2006.67
Female athletes filed 375, or 90%, of those complaints; 2.9 million female K–
12 students generated 317 of them, while 170,526 women playing college
sports produced 58 complaints. 68 The authors of the NWLC study
hypothesized that the significantly higher rate of complaints generated by the
college women “likely reflects high school students’ lack of knowledge about
Title IX and their rights under the law.” 69
The complaints filed by females, consisting of both K–12 students and
college students, most often alleged inequitable treatment of girls’ or women’s
teams. 70 An illustrative example is the athletic program at Holt High School
in Tuscaloosa, Alabama, which the NWLC study examined in May 2005.
Comparisons of (1) the boys’ baseball team and the girls’ softball team and (2)
the boys’ and girls’ basketball teams demonstrated the problem. The baseball
team played on a newly upgraded field, complete with renovated dugouts, a
bullpen, and a batting cage, while the softball team used a field and batting
cage that were inadequately maintained and lacked a bullpen, admissions gate,

64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

Id. at 187.
Porto, supra note 2, at 32.
BRAKE, supra note 4, at 201.
NAT’L WOMEN’S LAW CTR., supra note 2, at 1.
Id. at 3–4.
Id. at 2.
Id. at 3–4.
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and freestanding concession stand. 71 The baseball team enjoyed a locker
room with heat, air conditioning, and plumbing, but the softball team was
forced to use a locker room that lacked all those amenities.72 The baseball
team wore new game uniforms provided by the school, which also provided
the boys’ practice uniforms, whereas each softball player had to purchase her
own game uniform at a cost of approximately $150, and the school furnished
no practice uniforms either.73 The baseball players also benefited from newer
equipment, while the softball players had to make do with older equipment,
including a “catcher’s helmet that presented a safety hazard because it did not
fit the team’s catcher.” 74
Similar inequities existed between the boys’ and girls’ basketball teams.
The boys’ team had a locker room that was separate from the locker room
used by the boys’ physical education classes, while the girls’ team shared a
locker room with the volleyball team and the girls’ physical education
classes. 75 The boys’ team wore matching home and away uniforms, with
warm-up pants, and received gym bags in which to carry their uniforms, but
the girls wore mismatched uniforms. 76 The boys’ team always had a driver to
transport it to away games, but the girls missed some away games because no
bus driver was available. 77 Furthermore, some girls’ teams at Holt had to start
their competitive seasons later than other area teams because their head
coaches doubled as assistant coaches for boys’ sports. 78 And when not
enough athletic trainers were available to attend the competitions of all Holt
teams on a particular day, the boys’ teams got first priority. 79
In contrast, at the college level, complaints to OCR about sex
discrimination against women in sports were more evenly divided between
allegations of inequitable treatment (40 of 105 or 38%) and lack of
participation opportunities (25 of 105 or 24%), respectively. 80 The sports
most frequently identified as receiving inequitable treatment were softball and
women’s soccer. 81 The category of inequitable treatment most often identified

71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Id. at 6.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 9–10.
Id. at 9.
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in complaints by both K–12 and college students was the facilities where they
practiced and competed. 82
Discrimination was not the only unhappy circumstance revealed by the
NWLC study, though. The study also noted that during the relevant time
period, OCR received twenty-four complaints of retaliation against K–12
students (fourteen) or coaches (ten) who had advocated for their teams. 83 Half
of the K–12 coaches who filed complaints with OCR alleged that their schools
had retaliated against them for their advocacy on behalf of their teams.84
Moreover, coaches filed thirty-two of the total complaints (K–12 and college)
that the NWLC studied, half of which alleged retaliation against the
complaining coach in addition to discrimination against female athletes.85
And about fourteen percent of the allegations against colleges for violating
Title IX charged that an institution had retaliated against persons who
protested sex discrimination in sports. 86 The complaining parties in these
instances were evenly divided between students and coaches. 87
The NWLC study offers powerful statistical evidence of continuing
discrimination and retaliation related to girls’ and women’s sports. But
individual cases often provide more vivid illustrations than statistical data can
of the emotional pain and derailed careers that can result from blowing the
whistle on sex discrimination in sports. No clearer examples of those tragic
consequences exist than the cases originating at Fresno State beginning in
2001.
During much of the 1990s, Fresno State’s athletic department was under
scrutiny by OCR after an investigation unearthed numerous Title IX
violations, including large disparities between male and female athletes in
participation opportunities and inequitable treatment of women’s teams.88
Under pressure to comply with Title IX, Fresno State agreed to implement a
Corrective Action Plan designed to increase the support for and enhance the
status of its women’s sports. 89 Nevertheless, in 2001, Associate Athletic
Director Diane Milutinovich complained internally about the athletic

82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 4.
86. Id. at 11.
87. Id.
88. Erin E. Buzuvis, Sidelined: Title IX Retaliation Cases and Women’s Leadership in College
Athletics, 17 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 1, 10 (2010).
89. Id.
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department falling short of its obligations under the plan.90 Later, in a
complaint to OCR, she noted the university’s failure to increase the percentage
of female athletes, which the plan required, the athletic department’s
reluctance to devote resources to women’s sports, compensation disparities
between coaches of men’s and women’s teams, and the denial of “tier one”
(most-favored) status to women’s sports in violation of the plan. 91 Shortly
thereafter, the new athletic director, Scott Johnson, announced a departmental
reorganization that eliminated Milutinovich’s position, resulting in her transfer
to a job at the student union. 92
Volleyball coach Lindy Vivas also raised the athletic director’s ire by
complaining about the inequitable treatment of women athletes at Fresno
State. Specifically, Vivas filed a complaint with OCR, contesting the
department’s hesitance to elevate volleyball to a tier-one sport. 93 She also
filed a grievance with the university’s human resources department
challenging disparities in the lengths of the employment contracts for male and
female coaches. 94 After being fired in 2004, Vivas, like Diane Milutinovich,
sued the university, alleging that her termination was in retaliation for having
blown the whistle on sex discrimination in the athletic department. 95
As if the Milutinovich and Vivas lawsuits were not enough soap opera for
one athletic department, a few months after Vivas was fired, the university
placed on administrative leave and later fired women’s basketball coach Stacy
Johnson-Klein. 96 Like Milutinovich and Vivas before her, Johnson-Klein
sued Fresno State, alleging that her termination was in retaliation for her
complaints about a lack of gender equity in the athletic department.97 Diane
Milutinovich settled her lawsuit with the university in October 2007 for $3.5
million, but both the Vivas and Johnson-Klein cases went to trial.98 After a
three-week trial in the summer of 2007, a jury awarded Vivas $5.85 million,
which the judge later reduced to $4.52 million—to that point the largest
amount ever awarded in a Title IX case.99 The jury believed Vivas’ claims
that she was terminated for advocating gender equity, especially, holding the

90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Id. at 10–11.
Id. at 11.
Id.; see also Hostetter, supra note 17.
Buzuvis, supra note 88, at 11.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 12.
Id. at 12–13.
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athletic department to its promise to elevate the status of volleyball and move
the team’s games from a gymnasium to the university’s arena and
recommending multi-year contracts for successful, long-serving female
coaches. 100 The jury also agreed with Vivas that her termination amounted
not only to retaliation but to direct discrimination based on her sex and her
perceived sexual orientation as a lesbian. 101 Presumably, Johnson-Klein’s
testimony on Vivas’ behalf about the athletic director’s plans to “get rid of
lesbians in the athletic department” in favor of “female coaches who were
straight and attractive” helped the jury find in Vivas’ favor. 102
Johnson-Klein’s own case produced a two-month trial. 103 She presented
evidence suggesting that the Fresno State athletic director had initiated an
investigation of her to find a reason to fire her and that the investigation had
begun shortly after she had threatened to file a complaint with OCR
concerning the treatment of her team by the athletic department. 104 JohnsonKlein admitted to having made a “poor decision” in asking a player for the
pain medication Vicadin, but she also showed that she was the victim of a
sexist double standard in that regard because the university had paid Ray
Lopes, its former men’s basketball coach, $200,000 to buy out his contract
after learning that he had helped his players conceal positive drug test
results. 105 Finally, Johnson-Klein presented evidence showing that being
“straight and attractive” was as much of a burden as a benefit because her
movie-star looks had caused her to experience harassment (unwanted
touching, solicitations, etc.) from a male colleague on numerous occasions.106
The jury awarded her $19.1 million, which the trial court reduced to $6.6
million, plus costs and attorney’s fees.107 The university appealed, but, in
June 2008, the parties settled, as the university agreed to withdraw its appeal
and pay Johnson-Klein $9 million over twenty years. 108
The results of the NWLC study and the retaliation actions litigated after
the Jackson decision, such as those filed by the former Fresno State
employees, make clear that, despite Jackson, girls and women continue to
experience inequitable treatment, double standards, homophobia, and sexual

100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

Id. at 12.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 13.
Id.
Id. at 13–14.
Id. at 14.
Id.
Id.
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harassment in interscholastic and intercollegiate sports.109 The retaliation
actions, in particular, have also alerted judges and juries to these continuing
violations of Title IX. 110 Moreover, these actions have produced favorable
results for plaintiffs largely because proving retaliation is often easier than
proving the underlying discriminatory conduct that preceded the retaliation.111
Still, those results have come mostly from settlements and jury verdicts
instead of a clear body of law regarding retaliation claims under Title IX.
Consequently, the lingering question raised by Jackson, which Professor
Deborah Brake raised in her 2010 book—namely, whether the law will protect
from retaliation a complainant who mistakenly contends that his or her
institution has violated Title IX—remains unanswered. 112 Part IV will discuss
the various approaches to answering this question that recent scholarship has
suggested.
IV. SUGGESTED ANSWERS TO A LINGERING QUESTION
The question whether Title IX will protect the mistaken complainant from
retaliation has arisen from the Supreme Court’s unstated assumption in
Jackson that the conduct prompting Roderick Jackson’s complaint was
unlawful. 113 In the Court’s view, retaliation is a form of unlawful
discrimination; hence, Title IX prohibits it as an extension of the underlying
discrimination. 114 This reasoning is problematic, though, as Professor Brake
has pointed out, because it suggests that Title IX protects from retaliation only
those complainants who suffered from retaliation after correctly identifying
unlawful discrimination at their respective institutions. 115 If Title IX was to
protect only such complainants, it would diverge dramatically from the
prevailing interpretation of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, to which
courts customarily look for guidance in construing retaliation claims based on

109. Id. at 38.
110. See id.
111. Id. at 39.
112. BRAKE, supra note 4, at 193–96. Professor Brake also identified two other lingering
questions after Jackson, namely, (1) what kinds of punishments qualify as “retaliation” under Title
IX, and (2) whether Title IX can protect a coach or athlete against retaliation by an institution other
than the one the coach or athlete originally accused of discrimination. The latter can also be stated to
ask whether Title IX can protect a coach or athlete who claims that another institution refused to hire
him or denied her an athletic scholarship in retaliation for having blown the whistle on the original
institution. Because of space limitations, this Article will not address these two questions. Id. at 196,
198.
113. Id. at 192.
114. Id. at 193.
115. Id.
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Title IX. 116 That is because Title VII does not require complainants to
correctly identify unlawful discrimination in order to be protected against
retaliation; instead, it requires them to have a “reasonable belief” that the
conduct they oppose amounts to discrimination.117
Unlike Title IX, Title VII includes an antiretaliation provision, which
prohibits an employer from punishing an employee who has either opposed an
unlawful employment practice (the “opposition clause”) or participated in any
manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under Title VII (the
“participation clause”).118 Since the Supreme Court’s per curiam decision in
Clark County School District v. Breeden, 119 courts have required plaintiffs
who bring Title VII retaliation actions under the opposition clause to show a
“reasonable belief” that the underlying employer conduct about which they
complained was unlawful discrimination.120 At first blush, this appears to be a
generous standard for the plaintiff, who may be able to prevail on the
retaliation issue even if the jury concludes that the underlying conduct of
which the plaintiff complained was not unlawful discrimination.121
But recent scholarship reveals that some lower courts have construed the
reasonable belief standard to implicitly require that the plaintiff-employee
report actual violations of law. 122 One commentator cites, as an example,
Jordan v. Alternative Resources Corp., 123 which held that Title VII did not
protect from retaliation by the employer an employee who reported a
coworker’s use of a racial slur because no employee could have reasonably
believed that the one-time use of a racial slur was unlawful discrimination. 124
Similarly, in her recent book, Professor Brake argues that courts have become
increasingly strict in interpreting the reasonable belief standard, leaving
unprotected from retaliation employees whose “knowledge of the law does not
match that of the courts.” 125 She cites, as examples, decisions rejecting
retaliation claims brought by gay, lesbian, and transgendered plaintiffs because
the Title VII precedents distinguish sex discrimination, which the statute
116. Id.; see also Burch v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 433 F. Supp. 2d 1110 (E.D. Cal. 2006).
117. BRAKE, supra note 4, at 193.
118. Brianne J. Gorod, Rejecting “Reasonableness”: A New Look at Title VII’s Anti-Retaliation
Provision, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 1469, 1481–82 (2007) (citing 42 U.S.C. §2000e-3(a)).
119. 532 U.S. 268, 269 (2001).
120. Richard Moberly, The Supreme Court’s Antiretaliation Principle, 61 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
375, 388 n.67 (2010).
121. Gorod, supra note 118, at 1483–84.
122. Moberly, supra note 120, at 448.
123. 458 F.3d 332 (4th Cir. 2006).
124. Moberly, supra note 120, at 449.
125. BRAKE, supra note 4, at 193.
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explicitly covers, from sexual orientation discrimination, which it does not.126
In this legal environment, Professor Brake continues, Title IX retaliation
claims brought by students are especially vulnerable to rejection by courts.
For example, a student may perceive disparate treatment of boys’ and girls’
teams in the same sport as a Title IX violation, even though less visible
practices favoring a girls’ team in another sport offset the disparate treatment
in the sport that is the subject of a complaint.127 In other words, the law
measures Title IX compliance by an overall comparison of the male and
female athletic programs at an institution, not by a sport-by-sport comparison,
a circumstance that a student complainant may be unaware.128 Similarly, a
student or coach who suffered retaliation after complaining about unequal
funding for girls’ and boys’ sports could be left without legal protection under
a strict interpretation of the reasonable belief standard because Title IX does
not require financial parity between male and female teams. 129 Presumably, a
court could conclude that the plaintiff’s belief to the contrary was
unreasonable.130
According to Professor Brake, applying such a strict interpretation of the
reasonable belief standard would be a mistake, not only because it would deny
protection from retaliation to athletes and their coaches but also because that
standard developed as a limitation only under the opposition clause of Title
VII, which applies exclusively to employees’ internal complaints about
discrimination. 131 The strict interpretation has not traditionally applied to
actions brought under the participation clause of Title VII because courts have
read that clause to, in Professor Brake’s words, “provide stronger legal
protection that does not depend on the merits of the underlying discrimination
claim.” 132 Moreover, unlike Title VII, Title IX lacks any express provision on
retaliation and any clause suggesting more limited protection for retaliation
under some circumstances than others. 133 Thus, Professor Brake concludes,
courts should construe Title IX to “provide the same level of protection from
retaliation regardless of whether the person complains internally to school
officials or files a formal complaint with the Office for Civil Rights or a

126. Id. at 193–94 (citing Hamner v. St. Vincent Hosp. & Health Care Ctr., Inc., 224 F.3d 701
(7th Cir. 2000); Spearman v. Ford Motor Co., 231 F.3d 1080 (7th Cir. 2000)).
127. Id. at 194–95.
128. Id. at 195.
129. See id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
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court.” 134
This conclusion leaves open the question of what standard should replace
the reasonable belief standard in guiding judicial gate-keeping concerning
Title IX retaliation claims. For her part, Professor Brake offers what might be
called a “good faith” standard. She writes, “Anyone who, in good faith,
challenges what he or she believes to be sex discrimination in sports should be
protected from retaliation under Title IX. Otherwise, standing up for Title
IX—a risky thing to do under the best of circumstances—could become a risk
not worth taking.” 135
Professor Brake’s recommended standard in Title IX retaliation cases is
similar to the standard recommended by recent commentaries concerning Title
VII retaliation cases. One such commentary observes that courts would
“promot[e] respect for the integrity of the rule of law” more effectively by
omitting an objective reasonableness requirement from the employee’s belief
The
that the employer has engaged in unlawful discrimination.136
commentary argues that instead of expecting fast-food workers (who may also
be high school athletes) to apply the objective reasonableness test, the law of
retaliation should “protect employees who speak in good faith, who do not
willfully abuse a reporting system or act with malice, or who repeatedly bring
the same complaint for the same alleged act.” 137 A second Title VII
commentary arguing for a good faith standard asserts that Title VII should
protect an employee from retaliation unless the employer could show that the
employee had lodged a complaint in bad faith. 138
Professor Richard Moberly has suggested a conceptual structure within
which to house the various good faith alternatives identified above. That
structure is what Professor Moberly calls the “Antiretaliation Principle,”
which, he maintains, “focuses on the notion that protecting employees from
retaliation will enhance the enforcement of the nation’s laws.” 139 In his view,
the Supreme Court’s retaliation jurisprudence involving statutory
interpretation during the past fifty years (including Jackson) has conveyed a
clear message that “employees play an important role in enforcing statutory
laws and the Court will provide employees broad protection from retaliation in

134. Id. at 195–96.
135. Id. at 196.
136. R. George Wright, Retaliation and the Rule of Law in Today’s Workplace, 44 CREIGHTON
L. REV. 749, 756 (2011).
137. Id. at 757.
138. Gorod, supra note 118, at 1474.
139. Moberly, supra note 120, at 378.
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order to enhance enforcement of those laws.” 140 According to Professor
Moberly, the majority opinion in Jackson explicitly adopted the Antiretaliation
Principle when it stated that unless retaliation is prohibited, the enforcement
scheme for Title IX will “unravel.” 141
Viewed in this way, the Jackson decision fits neatly into the Supreme
Court’s retaliation jurisprudence, which focuses on protecting employees from
retaliation so that they will be encouraged to report illegal conduct. The Court
assumes that employees’ reports will aid law enforcement by alerting
authorities to unlawful discrimination, thereby deterring employer
violations. 142 In keeping with this emphasis on facilitating law enforcement,
Professor Moberly recommends replacing the current reasonable belief
standard with a more relaxed version that would “simply encourage employees
to come forward with information that a reasonable person with their
knowledge and educational experience would believe to be a violation of the
law.” 143 “Society would be better off,” he concludes, “with knowledgeable
decision[-]makers determining whether the disclosed, questionable conduct
violates the law after an employee’s report, instead of lay employees trying to
determine legality before they report.” 144
Thus, as the foregoing discussion has shown, the reasonable belief
standard used in Title VII cases is neither the only nor, necessarily, the best
one for judging whether the plaintiff in a Title IX retaliation action genuinely
thought he or she was blowing the whistle on unlawful conduct when lodging
a complaint about perceived sex discrimination. Part V of this Article will
offer alternative standards that are more compatible with Title IX and the
Supreme Court’s retaliation jurisprudence.
V. A “CONTEXTUAL REASONABLENESS” OR GOOD FAITH STANDARD
SHOULD APPLY IN TITLE IX RETALIATION CASES
Courts should reject the reasonable belief standard in Title IX retaliation
cases for three reasons. First, it does not fit the interscholastic or
intercollegiate sports context from whence Title IX claims arise because the
presumptive complainants, like the fast-food workers alluded to earlier, may
not understand what is and what is not unlawful discrimination under the
statute. The athletes are young and likely to be unsophisticated in legal
140. Id. at 392; see, e.g., Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006);
Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t, 555 U.S. 271 (2009).
141. Moberly, supra note 120, at 422 (quoting Jackson, 544 U.S. at 180).
142. Id. at 430.
143. Id. at 451.
144. Id. at 449 (emphasis added).
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matters; hence, they may well overreact to perceived inequities that do not
amount to unlawful discrimination. They may also be eager to earn or to
retain athletic scholarships or playing time, leaving them vulnerable to
retaliation by a coach or athletic director.
Coaches, too, may be
unsophisticated about legal issues affecting the games they teach, especially
when young and inexperienced; under these circumstances, coaches, like
athletes, who challenge conduct they think is unlawful could well be subject to
retaliation. Unfortunately for these coaches and athletes, the reasonable belief
standard in Title VII retaliation law does not take into account the subjective
circumstances of the complainant in determining whether that person acted
reasonably in challenging the complained-of conduct. 145 Instead, the view of
“reasonableness” that customarily governs is that of one who knows the
lawnamely, the judge.146
Second, the reasonable belief standard is out of step with the Jackson
decision’s embrace of Professor Moberly’s Antiretaliation Principle. That
principle aims to encourage employers to obey the law; therefore, any standard
that courts adopt after Jackson should deter unlawful discrimination in
interscholastic and intercollegiate sports. But a standard that measures the
reasonableness of a high school athlete’s belief in the unlawfulness of certain
conduct by the sensibilities of a middle-aged judge is more likely to deter
complaints by young athletes than unlawful discrimination by schools and
colleges. Indeed, if a school or college retaliates against an athlete with
impunity, as is predictable under a strict reasonable belief standard, that athlete
will be unlikely ever to complain again, as will her teammates. Thus, in the
wake of Jackson, courts should adopt a standard that is more sensitive to the
age, maturity levels, and legal sophistication of high school and college
athletes than the existing reasonable belief standard.
Third, the reasonable belief standard does not coincide with the Supreme
Court’s broad reading of Title IX in Jackson or with the canon of statutory
construction stating that courts should construe remedial statutes, such as Title
IX, broadly so as to provide plaintiffs with the best opportunity to obtain relief
for the injuries they have suffered. After all, in Jackson, the majority did not
require the plaintiff to show that the defendant school had actually
discriminated against his players in violation of Title IX.147 And it construed
the statute’s prohibition against discrimination “on the basis of sex” to include
retaliation against a coach who complains about sex discrimination suffered by

145. Deborah L. Brake, Retaliation, 90 MINN. L. REV. 18, 99 (2005).
146. Id.
147. Id. at 85.
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his or her athletes. 148
That reading of Title IX is consistent with the longstanding canon of
statutory construction stating that a “remedial statute should be liberally
construed in order to effectuate the remedial purpose for which it was
enacted.” 149 A liberal construction is ordinarily one that applies the statutory
principle to more subjects or more circumstances than would be the case under
a strict construction.150 A court may interpret a remedial statute to apply in
circumstances not specifically considered by the legislature “so long as those
circumstances are within the ambit of the [statute’s] purposes,” and the court
should give the terms used in the statute the most extensive meaning to which
they are reasonably susceptible.151 Common examples of remedial statutes
are auto insurance legislation, which is liberally construed to give the broadest
protection possible to accident victims, consumer fraud legislation, and
whistleblowers’ protection acts. 152
The Jackson Court implicitly acknowledged that Title IX is a remedial
statute when it observed that “[i]f retaliation were not prohibited, Title IX’s
enforcement scheme would unravel,” thereby subverting the statutory purpose
of rectifying discrimination against girls and women in schools and
colleges. 153 Moreover, in litigation during the 1990s between college women
and their institution regarding athletic participation opportunities, the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit observed that “Title IX was enacted in
order to remedy discrimination that results from stereotyped notions of
women’s interests and abilities.” 154 Thus, the remedial nature of Title IX
warrants giving its terms the broadest meaning to which they are reasonably
susceptible.
Considering the limitations of the reasonable belief standard and the
remedial purpose of Title IX, courts should replace that standard with one that
is more compatible with the statutory purpose. Accordingly, Title IX should
protect from retaliation even the plaintiff who mistakenly identifies underlying

148. Jackson, 544 U.S. at 179.
149. NORMAN J. SINGER & J.D. SHAMBIE SINGER, STATUES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
§ 60:1 (7th ed. 2008).
150. Id.
151. Id. § 60:2.
152. Id. § 60:1; see, e.g., Shallal v. Catholic Soc. Servs. of Wayne Cnty, 566 N.W.2d 571 (Mich.
1997) (noting that the Whistleblowers’ Protection Act prohibits future employer reprisals against
whistleblowing-employees in order to encourage employees to report violations of law).
153. Jackson, 544 U.S. at 180.
154. Cohen v. Brown Univ., 101 F.3d 155, 179 (1st Cir. 1996); see also Brian L. Porto,
Completing the Revolution: Title IX as Catalyst for an Alternative Model of College Sports, 8 SETON
HALL J. SPORTS L. 351, 372–73 (1998).
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institutional conduct as unlawful by using, at a minimum, Professor Moberly’s
suggested standard, which might be called “contextual reasonableness.” It
would ask whether a reasonable person with the plaintiff’s knowledge and
educational experience would believe that the conduct complained of was
unlawful. 155 Better yet, Title IX should protect this plaintiff unless the
defendant institution can show that the plaintiff complained in bad faith, that
is, deceitfully or with a reckless disregard for the truth. 156 The latter standard
is preferable because it is less likely than the former to be diluted by judicial
notions of what a high school or college athlete should know about the law.
Still, either alternative would more accurately reflect the athletic context in
which Title IX retaliation claims arise and the broad remedial purpose of Title
IX than does the reasonable belief standard currently in effect.
VI. CONCLUSION
Despite representing a big step forward in the evolution of Title IX
jurisprudence, Jackson v. Birmingham Board of Education did not indicate
how much protection from retaliation Title IX provides if the underlying
conduct prompting the complaint was lawful. Presumably, courts will answer
this question by using the reasonable belief standard of Title VII, which only
protects the plaintiff who has an objectively reasonable belief that the conduct
complained of is unlawful. But this standard is inappropriate for the sports
context, in which many potential plaintiffs are young and unsophisticated
about the law. It is also contrary to the Supreme Court’s historic concern for
law enforcement and to the principle that courts should construe remedial
statutes, such as Title IX, liberally. Therefore, in Title IX retaliation cases,
when the conduct complained of is lawful, courts should reject the reasonable
belief standard and protect the plaintiff if either (1) a reasonable person with
the plaintiff’s knowledge and educational experience would believe that the
conduct was unlawful or (2) the defendant cannot show that the plaintiff acted
in bad faith. Either alternative would be more compatible than the reasonable
belief standard is with interscholastic and intercollegiate sports and with the
remedial purpose of Title IX. The fortieth anniversary of the enactment of
Title IX presents a wonderful opportunity for courts to adopt a new standard.

155. Moberly, supra note 120, at 450.
156. Gorod, supra note 118, at 1474; Wright, supra note 136, at 757.

